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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANCH HOMES, INC. , 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
Case No. 15467 
GREATER PARK CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Ranch Homes, brought this action for damages 
for breach of an option agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The first trial was by jury, which found against the 
defendant, Greater Park City Company. Greater Park City 
Company thereupon promptly made a Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict and, alternatively, for a New Trial. The 
Honorable Peter F. Leary granted Greater Park City Company's 
Motion for a New Trial. The new trial was had, without a 
jury, before the Honorable James s. Sawaya. At the conclusion 
of the second trial, the Court entered judgment against Greater 
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Park City Company in the sum of $42,587.00, together with 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $6,196.12 and costs 
in the amount of $655.30. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Greater Park City Company seeks reversal of the 
judgment or, alternatively, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1974. 
Ranch Homes is a corporation formed in the summer of 
(Transcript of First Trial, Volume 1, page 21, herein-
after 1st Tr., 1 at 21; Transcript of Second Trial, page 24, 
hereinafter 2d Tr. at 24). James Fahs is plaintiff's presider.: 
and Grant Kesler and Michael Tuckett are vice-presidents. (ls' 
Tr., 1 at 21 & 43). 
On September 3, 1974, Ranch Homes entered into an 
Option Agreement with Greater Park City Company to purchase 
approximately 30 acres of undeveloped property in Park City, 
Utah. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 -- unless otherwise noted, all 
exhibits referred to will be those introduced in the second 
trial and found at Record on Appeal, page 192, hereinafter 
R.192). The consideration paid by Ranch Homes for the option 
was $10,000. (See paragraph 1 of plaintiff's Exhibit 2) · 
Paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement provided that the option 
period was to expire at 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 1975. If Ranch 
Homes elected to exercise the option, it was to give written 
notice of such election to Greater Park City Company on or 
-2-
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before April 1, 1975. (Paragraph 3). 
The Option Agreement contained two purchase prices: 
$480,000 if paid in cash on or before the closing date; or, 
at Ranch Homes' election, $510,000 payable in installments 
of $50,000 on or before the closing date and $150,000 plus 
interest on April 1st of 1976, 1977, and 1978. (Paragraph 5). 
Ranch Homes elected the installment payment method 
(plaintiff's Exhibit 1), but did not appear on the closing 
date to tender the first $50,000 payment. (1st Tr., 1 at 70; 
2d Tr. at 202). The property subsequently passed into the 
hands of defendant's principal creditor, a third party. 
(1st Tr., 2 at 107; 2d Tr. at 202). 
Throughout most of both trials, Ranch Homes expressed 
its intent to use the property for an FHA-insured, single-
family housing development. (1st Tr., 1 at 33-35; 2d Tr. at 
25). The first phase of the proposed development would have 
entailed the construction of 32 homes, with a sales price in 
the range of $54,000 to.$55,000. (1st Tr., 1 at 50; 2d Tr. at 
265). The houses would be constructed in a "cluster" around 
cul-de-sacs. (1st Tr., 1 at 37 & 39; 2d Tr. at 29). 
At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury 
answered a Special Verdict, in which it found that Greater 
Park City Company had repudiated or breached the Option Agree-
ment, and that Ranch Hornes was thereby excused from tendering 
$50,000 on the closing date. (R. 91). Judge Sawaya made 
similar findings and conclusions. (R.163). Greater Park City 
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Company does not contesL these findings on appeal. 
Rather, what Greater Park City Company does dispute is the 
amount of damages awarded to Ranch Homes and the methods by 
which the damages were computed. 
Judge Sawaya found (Finding No. 13, R.166) that 
between September 3, 1974, and April 30, 1975, Ranch Homes, 
in reasonable reliance upon the Option Agreement, expended 
the sum of $27,587.00, and through its officers performed 
services of a value of $15, 000. 00, in preparation for perfor-
mance of the contract, in part performance of the contract, 
and in planning for the development of the optioned property. 
These expenditures and services, the Judge found, were of the 
type contemplated by the contract and were foreseeable by the 
parties at the time the contract was executed. Id. Interest 
and costs were added to these reliance damages in the judgment. 
(See R.168). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPENDITURES WERE NOT REASONABLY MADE 
IN PERFORMANCE OF THE OPTION AGREEMENT OR NECESSARY 
PREPARATION THEREOF, AND GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY 
DID NOT HAVE REASON TO FORESEE THEM AS A PROBABLE 
RESULT OF ANY BREACH WHEN THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS MADE. 
Damages for breach of contract are awarded only ~~: 
"[T]he defendant had reason to foresee [those 
injuries] as a probable result of his breach 
when the contract was made. If the injury is 
one that follows the breach in the usual course 
of events, there is sufficient reason for the 
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defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it must 
be shown specifically that the defendant had 
reason to know the facts and to foresee the 
Tnjury." (Emphasis added). 
Restatement of Contracts § 330. 
cf. pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
_!Edemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1938). Also, 
before reliance damages may be awarded, the amount of plain-
tiff's expenditures must be found to have been "reasonably 
made." Restatement of Contracts § 333. If the plaintiff's 
expenditures are unreasonable and unnecessary for the purpose 
of carrying out the contract, then they must not be allowed. 
See United States v. Behan, 11-0 U.S. 338 (1883). 
To sustain the trial court's finding, this Court must 
concur that the following expenditures, among others, were both 
foreseeable by defendant at the time the Option Agreement was 
executed and that they were reasonably made: 
1. Expenditures incurred prior to the 
execution of the Option Agreement on September 3, 
1974. 
2. Expenditures incurred prior to plaintiff's 
exercise of the Option on April 1, 1975. 
3. Expenditures incurred in designing the 
housing development in an extraordinary manner 
with "cluster" housing at the end of cul-de-sac 
streets, and with unusual planting islands in·· 
the middle of each cul-de-sac. 
4. Expenditures incurred in the form of 
-5-
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services performed by plaintiff's officers in 
attempting to obtain loans for the development, 
and in pursuing FHA financing where conventional 
financing would allow lower down payments by 
potential buyers. 
5. Expenditures incurred during the option 
period in the form of services performed by 
one of plaintiff's officers in drafting 
architectural plans for the proposed houses, 
rather than plaintiff's purchasing plans from 
a design firm for many thousands of dollars less. 
6. Expenditures incurred during the option 
period in the form of services performed by one 
of plaintiff's officers in preparing completed 
engineering plans where a simple preliminary 
plot would have sufficed. 
7. Expenditures incurred by plaintiff for 
logo and brochure design. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
5, Check No. 116). 
8. Expenditures incurred in the incorpora-
tion of plaintiff and in the drafting of a prior 
limited partnership agreement. 
9. Expenditures incurred in the drafting 
of final architectural and engineering plans 
for all phases of development notwithstanding 
the fact that only Phase I was to be completed 
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in ]975, and incurred before exercising the 
option, before receiving FHA approval and before 
a construction loan was approved. 
10. Expenditures incurred for all of the 
above items even though, as plaintiff finally 
testified at the conclusion of the Second Trial, 
a purchaser could have bought a lot from plaintiff 
and built his own house upon it without using 
plaintiff's plans! 
It is respectfully submitted that these items of 
damage charged to defendant were neither foreseeable nor 
reasonable. As the uncontroverted testimony of defendant's 
expert witness, Mr. Herbert Trayner, a subdivider and 
licensed general contractor, established, the industry stan-
dard for the steps to be taken by a reasonably prudent 
developer after obtaining an option but before exercising it 
are as follows: 
First, a' developer must assure himself that the property 
can be rezoned if it is not already zoned for the intended use. 
(2d Tr. at 302-303). The developer must indicate to the zoning 
authority who owns the property, the number of units per acre 
which will be constructed upon it, and whether it is going to 
be single-family, commercial or whatever. (2d Tr. at 303). 
To effect a zoning change, if it can be done, takes an· average 
of between six to eight weeks. The developer's expenditure of 
~ consists of "a little leg work." (2d Tr. at 306, 316). 
-7-
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In talking with the zoning board, it is helpful to 
have a preliminary plat showing the configuration of the 
use to which the developer intends to put the land. !".o other 
----------.: 
renderings, working drawings, architectural or engineering 
plans are needed until after the option is exercised. If 
a developer has a good working relationship with an engineeri:· 
firm, they will do a preliminary plat without charge. Ot~~ 
wise, it will cost around $500. (2d Tr. at 303-304). Also, 
with a preliminary plat, a developer can get a reasonably 
strong commitment from a lender assuming that he can get the 
zoning he is looking for. There is no need for architectural 
drawings or completed engineering plans to talk to lenders 
during the option period. "That's just too much expense to 
get into at this point." (2d Tr. at 306-307, emphasis suppliE: 
During the option period, a developer should also 
talk to subcontractors to get a preliminary estimate of costs. 
Estimates for off-site improvements can be based on the 
preliminary plat. ( 2d Tr. at 3 0 6) • For the houses themselves, 
hiring an architect is just too exoensive. Design firms sell 
housing plans that are current on styles, cost and desirabili: 
Each plan includes six sets of prints, enough to get bids and 
to build the homes. Each plan costs from $100 to $400 per 
house. Many developers can even avoid this expense since 
they have their own plan files. (2d Tr. at 307-309). 
If a developer decides to qualify for FHA financing, 
his only need is to get a verbal understanding that FHA 1·70uld 
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be interested in underwriting the houses at a certain price 
range. During the option period it is premature to submit 
any plans to them. (2d Tr. at 315-316). The FHA will work 
with a developer on a very preliminary basis since they do 
not want him to spend any more money than is necessary. 
(2d Tr. at 325). 
The key, therefore, is to keep expenditures to a 
minimum during the option period. As Mr. Trayner testified: 
"With the exception of whatever charge the 
engineer may have to work a -- work out a 
preliminary plat and unless the community 
would require some sort of a filing fee, 
there shouldn't have to be any costs." 
(2d Tr. at 316). 
In contrast to the standards of the industry, plaintiff's 
damages included the following unforeseeable and unreasonable 
expenditures incurred by plaintiff during the option and, 
therefore, prior to the time plaintiff had committed to purchase 
the property. Plaintiff's vice-president and attorney, Grant 
Kesler, was paid a lump sum of $2,500 for all legal services 
rendered. (1st Tr., 1 at 91-92; 2d Tr. at 121-122 & 127-128; 
plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Check No. 110). This expenditure, 
however, included services rendered in the organization and 
formation of the plaintiff, which occurred prior to the execution 
of the Option Agreement. (2d Tr. at 121 & 128). Ranch Homes 
was first organized by Mr. Kesler as a limited partnership and, 
after some tax advice, it was changed to a Subchapter "S" 
corporation. Mr. Kesler's services not only included the 
-9-
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drafting of the corporate Articles, By-laws, Minutes, and 
stock certificates, but also the negotiation and drafting of 
the Option Agreement itself. (2d Tr. at 72 & 121-122). It 
is respectfully submitted that Greater Park City Company 
could not foresee damages relating to the formation of plain-
tiff and the execution of the Option Agreement. 
Plaintiff paid $5,000 to its president, Mr. Fahs, for 
drafting final architectural plans. (1st Tr., 1 at 54 & 66; 
2d Tr. at 33; plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Check Nos. 102, 105, 107 
& 111). Plaintiff expended another $5, 000 in payment to its 
vice-president, Mr. Tuckett, a licensed engineer, for his 
"managerial" services which included meeting with the FHA and 
the Park City Engineer to coordinate all drawings and desi~ 
work. {1st Tr., 1 at 74-75 & 86; 2d Tr. at 110; plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5, Check Nos. 103, 106, 109, 114 & 115). Both the~ 
expenditures were charged to defendant. In addition, plain-
tiff claimed to have been damaged in the amount of $17,500 
for Mr. Fahs' "quarterbacking" services. Mr. Fahs was involve' 
in the negotiation of the Option Agreement, working with the 
Park City Master Plan Committee and Planning Commission to 
rezone the property and to get a , )roval for their "cluster" 
concept of housing, and in meeting with the various lenders 
and with FHA. (1st Tr., 1 at 37-39 and 2 at 33; 2d Tr. at 60i 
.Mr. Fahs testified that he spent seven months full time on the 
project, that if he had been working for a developer in Salt 
. d therefoti Lake, he would have been earning $30,000 a year, an ' 
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his seven-month salary would equate to $17,500. (1st Tr., 2 at 
33-34; 2d Tr. at 60-61) · Also, plaintiff claimed $22,750 for 
~ engineering plans drawn by Mr. Tuckett. The engineering 
plans, of course, conformed to the nature of the architectural 
plans in the platting of the property and designing the roads, 
sewer system, and water and drainage systems for "cluster" 
housing on cul-de-sac streets. (See plaintiff's Exhibits 14 
and 15; 1st Tr., 1 at 76; cf. 2d Tr. at 109). The Trial Judge 
awarded $15,000 for Mr. Tuckett's engineering and Mr. Fahs' 
•quarterbacking" services. Plaintiff's expenditures for the 
services performed by Mr. Fahs and Mr. Tuckett suffer from 
numerous defects. 
Some of the work these two individuals performed was 
rendered before the Option Agreement was executed. (2d Tr. 
at 70). Plaintiff failed in its proof to distinguish between 
services rendered before and after execution. (See 2d Tr. at 
60, 70, 73 & 8.6). Also, all but a very small portion of the 
damages awarded plaintiff were for expenditures made and 
services performed before plaintiff exercised its option. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 5). Can it be said that it is both 
foreseeable and reasonable that plaintiff would prepare final 
architectural and engineering plans before a construction loan 
was granted and before plaintiff purchased the property? Can 
it also be said that it is both foreseeable and reasonable 
that plaintiff would prepare architectural plans at all, rather 
than using a design firm? 
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Can it be said that it was both foreseeable ana 
reasonable for plaintiff to continue in its attempt to 
secure an FHA commitment when the sales price on its homes 
was $55,000? As the testimony of defendant's expert · 
w1 tness, 
Mr. Gordon Hashimoto, Assistant Professor of Architecture at 
the University of Utah, established, it was not prudent to 
have FHA financing for houses selling in this price range. 
(2d Tr. at 247-248). Since the FHA loan limit at the ti~ 
was $45,000, a $55,000 house would require a $10,000 down 
payment, or 18% of the purchase price. Conventional financin: 
(without FHA) would have made lower down payments available 
for buyers. (Id.). Mr. Trayner concurred in this conclusion 
and added that a prudent developer should get just a verbal 
understanding from the FHA during the option period. (2d Tr. 
at 315-316). The FHA will work with a developer on a 
preliminary basis; there is no need to spend a lot of money 
or time in working with them. (2d Tr. at 325). 
Plaintiff's choice of "cluster" housing at the end of 
cul-de-sac streets with planting islands in the middle of eac 
cul-de-sac, rather than conventional single-family housing, 
necessitated additional expenditures which were awarded again 
defendant. Plaintiff's own witnesses testified that the extr 
designed into the proposed subdivision, such as circular 
planters in the center of cul-de-sac streets, "made the ~5~ 
more difficult on this project" (1st Tr., 1 at 104), and "toe 
a great deal more engineering." 31 ) Plaintiff (2d Tr. at . 
-12-
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also "had the hardest ti~e in the world tryinq to convince" 
the FHA and the zoning board to accept this design. (2d Tr. 
at 29, 31 & 76). It was something very foreign to them. 
(Id.). Can it be said that it is both foreseeable and 
reasonable that plaintiff would spend substantial sums of 
money in designing such unusual and difficult features into 
its proposed subdivision before actually purchasing the 
property? As Professor Hashimoto testified, cluster housing 
is really an alternative to urban housing, not to the type 
of suburban housing the plaintiff was proposing. Its design 
was not appropriate at plaintiff's particular site. (2d Tr. 
at 233-235). In any event, the question here is whether 
such expenditures could be reasonably anticipated as damages 
flowing from the breach by the defendant of the Option Agreement. 
As Mr. Trayner testified, it does not take full time 
work for seven months to get financing, zoning and FHA 
approvals. (2d Tr. at 316). In light of Mr. Trayner's 
testimony, can it be said to be both foreseeable and reason-
able that Mr. Tucket would spend $5,000 of his time and 
Mr. Fahs $17,500 of his time in dealing with these groups? 
Also, as Mr. Trayner testified, a developer needs only a 
preliminary plot, not final engineering plans, to talk to 
zoning boards and lenders. (2d Tr. at 303-304, 306-307 & 
315-316). Can it then be said to be both foreseeable and 
reasonable that Mr. Tuckett would spend $22,750 of his time 
in preparing such plans prior to obtaining a zoning change, 
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exercising the option, and purchasing the property? 
The most substantial problem, however, that plaintif; 
has with its claimed expenditures relates to a startling 
admission made at the close of the seco'ld trial. 'rhroughout 
the first and almost all of the second trial, plaintiff 
maintained that its intent was to build homes. In the first 
trial, Mr. Fahs, plaintiff's president, testified as follows: 
"QUESTION: Now, was it Ranch Homes' intent 
to develop the property and sell vacant 
lots, building lots, or was it their intent 
to build homes on these properties and sell 
them? 
ANSWER: It was Ranch Homes' intent to build 
homes. We didn't feel that the market in 
Park City--there were plenty of lots on the 
market. The idea was to try to sell an FHA 
approved $50,000 home with $45,000 financing 
at a good interest rate with a very low down 
payment and actually get people who were 
servicing the resort operation, provide them 
with a place to live." 
(1st Tr., 3 at 13). 
(Accord 2d Tr. at 77, 271-272). At the conclusion of the 
second trial, Mr. Fahs contradicted all of his prior testirnon 
in the following dialogue: 
"QUESTION: Did you have the idea that you 
would sell individual lots without building 
the homes on them? 
ANSWER: Yes, I believe my proforma that 
was prepared in the Summer of 1974 reflected 
that fact. 
* * * 
QUESTION: Then Mr. Fahs on this Exhibit 9 
[plaintiff's master plan prepared by llr. Fahs] 
are you telling me the buyer of this lot would 
use your plan or wouldn't? 
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ANSWER: He would -- he could use my plan. 
If he didn't use my plan, he could use his 
own plan. 
* * * 
QUESTION: I see. So then you would have 
been willing to just sell thirty-two lots 
and not build houses? 
ANSWER: Oh, I think we -- we -- we had 
that as in the back of our minds 
(2d Tr. at 387-390). 
(~,defendant's Exhibit 25). It is respectfully submitted 
that neither the architectural or engineering plans, nor 
any of the management services performed by either Mr. Fahs 
or Mr. Tuckett, were foreseeable or reasonable in light of 
Mr. Fahs' amazing testimony that a buyer could have purchased 
just a lot from plaintiff and built his own house upon it. 
A prospective purchaser did not have to use plaintiff's plans 
at all! 
In similar situations, the courts have denied claims 
of reliance damages. In the case of Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County 
of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 87 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1970), the 
appellant sued, inter alia, for $14,237.33 interest paid on 
loans which it had obtained to fund the initial development of 
its business venture. The trial court excluded this item of 
special damage. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated: 
"[G)eneral damages are ordinarily confined 
to those which would naturally arise from 
the breach, or which might have been reason-
ably contemplated or foreseen by both parties, 
at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach. Second, if 
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special circumstances cause some unusual 
injury, special damages are not recoverable 
therefor unless the circumstances were 
known or should have been known to the 
guilty party at the time he entered into 
the contract. The requirement of knowledge 
or notice as a prerequisite to the recovery 
of special damages is based on the theory 
that a party does not and cannot assume 
limitless responsibility for all consequences 
of a breach, and that at the time of con-
tracting he must be advised of the facts 
concerning special harm which might result 
therefrom, in order that he may determine 
whether or not to accept the risk of 
contracting." [italics in original] 
Id. at 744. 
In Sitlington v. Fulton, 281 F. 2d 552 (10th Cir. 1960) 
the plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant for t~ 
sale of a farm. Conveyance of that farm was delayed because 
defendant's tenant refused to vacate the premises without a 
court order. In denying plaintiff's claim for cattle losses 
and related expenses, the Tenth Circuit stated: 
"Special damages could not be recovered 
unless in contemplation of the parties at 
the time the contract was executed. The 
sellers could not have foreseen that the 
purchaser would buy cattle or incur expenses 
in planting crops and making improvements 
on the farm before obtaining complete 
possession." 
Id. at 556. 
Accord, "whatever expenditure . made was in full awarenes' 
of the contingencies to be met before defendants would come 
into ownership of the land Corporation Nine v. T~ 
30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973). 
The courts are also clear that expenditures made befori 
a contract is entered into may not be recovered. Cacavas v. 
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~, 43 Mich. App. 222, 203 N.W.2d 913 (1972) (expenses 
incurred before a contract is made are not in the contempla-
tion of the parties); 17 A.L.R.2d, infra at 1314 ("For 
expenditures incurred before the actual making of the 
contract, a defendant is not liable unless he is affirmatively 
shown to have assumed responsibility for them. The action is 
based upon the contract and can include only losses sustained 
as a consequence of it.") • 
Reliance damages are not recoverable where the 
expenditures are made in a collateral undertaking (such as 
the development of plaintiff's proposed subdivision) rather 
than in performance of the agreement sued upon (plaintiff's 
option to purchase certain land). See Mendoyoma, supra; 
Schnierow v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App. 336, 164 P. 1132 (1917) 
(not foreseeable that a purchaser of real property, in 
reliance upon his contract, would sell his own property at 
a sacrifice); Susiv. Simonds, 147 Me .. 189, 85 A.2d 178 
(1951) ("It must affirmatively appear that the special 
circumstances 
the defendant 
were communicated by the plaintiff to 
at the time of making the contract."); 
Scheer v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 821, 205 N.W. 250 (1925) (where 
the expenses of procuring a loan to secure conveyance were 
held too remote because such expenses arose out of a 
collateral transaction); Chamberlain v. Brady, 17 Jones & 
Spencer 484, 49 N.Y. Superior Ct. Reports 484 (1882 N.Y.), 
~f'd without opinion, 94 N.Y. 649 (costs of architect's 
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plans in preparing to build on land held not foreseeable); 
17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1308-1313, Anno: "Right to recover, in 
action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in 
preparation for performance"; 11 Williston on Contracts 
§ 1363A (3d ed.) (expenditures are not recoverable unless 
they "should properly have been anticipated as necessary 
for the performance of the contract and are peculiarly 
appropriate for that purpose, rather than for the plaintiff's 
general business"); cf. St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515, 
422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969) (in an action against a union 
for unfairly representing plaintiff after his dismissal 
from a job, damages for humiliation and embarrassment and 
for loss of his home to the mortgage holder were held not 
foreseeable) . 
In the instant case, not only were plaintiff's 
expenditures unforeseeable, but they also related to collatera. 
transactions plaintiff's incorporation and the development 
of its proposed subdivision. Plaintiff's recovery should 
be set aside since its expenditures were completely within 
its discretion and control, were not in performance of the 
Option Agreement, but rather in preparation for its collateral 
transactions of incorporation and developing a subdivis~n, 
were within the risks it assumed, and were made prior to the 
time plaintiff would come into ownership of the property. 
The ~arties' Option Agreement did not contemplate that 
plaintiff should prepare to build a subdivision before it 
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acquired the financing to purchase the optioned property 
and before it received a conveyance thereof. It was simply 
not foreseeable that the plaintiff would com?lete almost 
all of its plans for a subdivision prior to exercising the 
option and receiving a conveyance of the property. 
Defendant submits, as is more fully discussed in 
the following section, that the only proper measure of 
damages for breach of an option is the difference between 
the contract price and the market value of the optioned 
property. However, if this Court declines to adopt the 
market value measure of damages, then defendant should 
reimburse plaintiff for the $10,000 option price it paid, 
along with certain limited additional expenditures. As 
the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Trayner established, 
a reasonably prudent subdivider, following industry standards, 
may have spent $500 for a preliminary engineering plat and 
$100 to $400 for house plans purchased from a design firm, 
and would have spent "a little time" in meeting with the 
planning commission, various lenders and the FHA. Defendant 
concedes that the total reasonable value of these services 
would be $2,000. Clearly, only these expenditures, totalling 
$12,000, are the natural, probable, and reasonable result of 
defendant's breach. 
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POINT II 
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN 
OPTION IS THE DIFFERENCE BET\'i'EEN THE MARKET VALUE 
OF THE LAND AND THE OPTION PRICE TO BE PAID. NO 
DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED FOR EXPENDITURES MADE. 
"The measure of damages in a case of this 
sort [breach of an option agreement] is 
the difference between the value of the 
property at the time the purchaser was to 
have a conveyance of it, and the price 
which he was then to pay. [citations 
omitted] The plaintiff has the benefit of 
this rule. He was not entitled to show 
loss of estimated profits or out of pocket 
expenses. Exceptional cases may arise 
where departure from the usual rule is 
permitted (see, e.g. Neal v. Jefferson, 
212 Mass. 517, 523, 99 N.E. 334, 41 
.L.R.A.N.S. 387), but this is not one of 
them." (Emphasis added). 
Capaldi v. Burlwood Realty Corp., 350 
Mass. 765, 214 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Mass. Sup. 
Jud. Ct . 19 6 6 ) . 
Accord, Cohen v. Lovitz, 255 F.Supp. 302 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1966). 
This is the same as the general measure of damages for 
failure to convey a piece of property. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 
Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962). The Neal case referred W 
in the quote above involved the lease of a hotel coupled 
with an option to purchase it. It presented "unusual circurn-' 
stances" because lost profits and reliance damages may be the 
natural and probable result of the breach of a lease agreem~·1 
Thus, the holding in Neal does not mean that lost profits and 1 
out-of-pocket expenses are recoverable for breach of an option 
agreement, but, rather, that where an agreement involves an 
option plus an additional promise, additional measures of 
damages may become relevant. 
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Awarding the difference between the market value 
and the option price would give plaintiff the benefit of 
its bargain and would adequately compensate plaintiff 
because it could then buy a comparable piece of property 
upon which to construct a subdivision. To hold otherwise 
would mean that an optionor bears the risk of all prepara-
tions made by an optionee, even though such expenditures 
may be completely within the discretion and contingent upon 
the whims of the optionee. See 17 ~.L.R.2d, supra at 1309. 
While one optionee may make substantial discretionary 
expenditures before the conveyance of the optioned property, 
another may only want time to think about the deal, while 
a third might make minor expenditures. April 30, 1975, would 
have been the earliest possible date for a conveyance of 
part or all of the property by the defendant. Prior to that 
date, plaintiff was not entitled to a conveyance. Thus, the 
preparatory steps plaintiff took towards development of its 
proposed subdivision were risks it knowingly assumed, because 
the purpose of an option is to minimize the loss an optionee 
suffers if he decides not to purchase the property, after 
taking the steps he deems necessary. 
Mr. Raymond Fletcher, a member of the American 
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, at defendant's request, 
appraised the optioned property as of April 1, 1975. (1st 
Tr., 2 at 114 & 116; 2d Tr. at 131-132). After analyzing 
comparable sales and market data, Mr. Fletcher testified that 
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the 30 acres of optioned property would have a value of 
$7, 350 an acre, or $220, 500 for the entire parcel. (1st Tr., 
2 at 119; 2d Tr. at 138). Using an income approach, 
Mr. Fletcher also testified that the property had a value 
of $7,347 per acre, or $220,420 for the entire parcel. 
(1st Tr., 2 at 123; 2d Tr. at 137). When this is compared 
with the purchase price of $510,000, it is respectfully 
submitted that plaintiff suffered no damage and that the 
judgment below should be reversed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES 
A plaintiff has the duty to minimize his damages. ~ 
may not sit idly by. A party injured by breach of contract 
should do what reasonable care and business prudence require 
to minimize his loss. Salt Bowl co. v. Utah, 535 P.2d 1253 
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1975); Enco, Inc. v. F.C. Russell Co., 210 Ore. 
324, 311 P.2d 737 (1957). A plaintiff cannot recover damages 
flowing from consequences which he could reasonably have 
avoided. Chesapeake& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916); 
Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P. 2d 801 (1970) i 
Jankele v. Texas co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936). 
It is submitted the evidence established, and reason· 
able minds cannot differ, that the plaintiff completely fai~ 
in its duty to mitigate its damages. On February 21, 1975, 
a meeting was held between the principals of plaintiff and 
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defendant. (1st Tr., 2 at 91-93; 2d Tr. at 188). At that 
meeting, defendant presented several alternative proposals 
to plaintiff in an attempt to convince plaintiff to take 
a parcel of property that was more accessible at that time. 
(1st Tr., 2 at 93; 2d Tr. at 190 & 192). This meeting was 
precipitated by defendant's concern over its ability to 
bring a road and utilities to the edge of the optioned 
property as required by paragraph 20 of the Option Agreement 
in the event that plaintiff chose to exercise the option by 
making installment payments. (1st Tr., 2 at 92 and 1 at 
42-44; 2d Tr. at 189-190). At that time, defendant's 
financial position was very weak with over $20,000,000 in 
debts. Defendant subsequently underwent reorganization. 
(See 1st Tr., 1 at 43; 2d Tr. at 202 & 211). 
The optioned property consisted of 30 acres at the 
northerly edge of an area known as the Holliday Ranch. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 2). Defendant first proposed an alterna-
tive to sell to plaintiff a 30-acre parcel of land in the 
Holliday Ranch area which already had access to roads and 
utilities, for $10,000 an acre or $300,000. (1st Tr., 2 at 
93-95; 2d Tr. at 192). Defendant's second alternative was 
to sell that 30 acres plus the riext 28 acres at $8,100 per 
acre for a total price of $480,000. (1st Tr., 2 at 95-96; 
2d Tr. at 192). Defendant also made a third proposal 
to sell 15 acres on the east side of the proposed Holliday 
Loop Road and 15 acres on the opposite side of that road. 
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(1st Tr., 2 at 96; 2d Tr. at 192). All of these alterna-
tives were rejected by plaintiff. (1st Tr., 2 at 98-99 
& 102-103). 
., 
The main reason plaintiff decided not to accept aey 
of the alternatives is that it would have to get the new 
property rezoned, redesigned, reengineered and reapproved 
by FHA. (1st Tr., 3 at 14-16; 2d Tr. at 376-377). However, 
since plaintiff admitted that it would sell a prospective 
purchaser a lot upon which he could build his own house, 
it is respectfully submitted that this is no excuse for 
plaintiff's failure to have mitigated its damages. 
Plaintiff also felt that the alternative property 
did not have as good a view as the optioned property, that 
it was too close to a sewage treatment plant, and that it 
had drainage problems. (1st Tr. , 3 at 14) . The drainage 
problem was corrected by the subsequent purchaser for $750 
an acre. (1st Tr., 2 at 143-144; 2d Tr. at 218). The 
new developer had no problem in selling all of the homes 
he developed, despite the sewage treatment plant. (1st Tr., 
3 at 5-8; 2d Tr. at 219-220). Apparently, since all of the 
homes were sold, the view from the alternate property did 
not differ appreciably from the optioned property. 
Plaintiff sued defendant only for damages. (See R.Hl 
Plaintiff, as a land developer, was not agonizing at the 
thought of losing real estate which would be impossible to 
duplicate. A substantial number of other tracts of land of 
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comparable size and quality had been offered to plaintiff. 
The remarkable thing about ~ost of these other tracts of land 
was that the price at which defendant proposed to sell them to 
plaintiff was substantially less than the $17,000 per acre 
plaintiff agreed to pay for the optioned property. Defendant 
had charged plaintiff a higher price under the Option Agree-
ment because of its duty to build a road out to the edge of 
the optioned property. (2d Tr. at 213-214, cf. 272-274). 
Since plaintiff could easily have mitigated all of its 
alleged damages, its failure to do so bars its right to 
recovery, and the judgment below should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES ARE TOO INDETER..~INABLE 
TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Plaintiff sued for $65,500 in reliance damages. 
(1st Tr., 2 at 1). These damages included $17,500 claimed 
for Mr. Fahs' "quarterbacking" services, and $22,750 for 
Mr. Tuckett' s engineering services. The first trial judge 
ruled as a matter of law that these expenditures were not 
recoverable "based upon the lack of evidence." (1st Tr., 
3 at 41). The second trial judge awarded only $15,000 in 
damages for these services. (Finding No. 13). As to the 
$27,587 which plaintiff expended, $5,000 of this was for 
Mr· Tuckett' s "management" services, $2, 500 for Mr. Kesler' s 
legal services, and another $5, 000 for Mr. Fahs' "engineering" 
services. The defects in all of these claimed services were 
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discussed in detail above. Because of these defects, 
defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff's damages 
are too indeterminable to support an award of prejudgment 
interest. 
The law in this State on prejudgment interest has 
been settled since the early case of Fell v. Union Pacifk 
Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907). In that case, this 
Court stated: 
"The true test to be applied as to whether 
interest should be allowed before judgment 
in a given case or not is, therefore, not 
whether the damages are unliquidated or 
otherwise, but whether the injury and con-
sequent damages are complete and must be 
ascertained as of a particular time and in 
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value, which the court 
or jury must follow in fixing the amount, 
rather than be guided by their best judgment 
in assessing the amount to be allowed for 
past as well as for future injury, or for 
elements that cannot be measured by any 
fixed standards of value." (Emphasis added). 
Id., 88 P. at 1007. 
Accord, Restatement of Contracts§ 337(a). The policy ~hi~ 
this test is simply that, as a matter of fairness, a person 
should not be liable for prejudgment interest when he does 
not, or cannot with reasonable certainty, know the true amount 
of the sum he owes. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's damages are too 
indeterminable to support an award of prejudgment interest 
for the following reasons: 
1. Both lower courts substantially discounted the 
amount claimed by plaintiff. 
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2. The evidence was disputed and plaintiff's 
proof was uncertain. 
3. Concerning many of the items of da~ages, plaintiff 
failed to establish any "fixed standards of value" or market 
prices. 
4. No prior demand for prejudgment interest was 
ever made by plaintiff, either in its complaint or in 
either trial. 
Plaintiff sued for $200,000 in damages. (R.4). In 
the first trial, plaintiff was awarded $27,587 for expenditures 
made and $16,000 for lost business profits. (R. 92). In the 
second trial, defendant's motion to dismiss the claim for 
lost business profits was granted. (2d Tr. at 19). Plaintiff 
proceeded in its attempt to collect $65,500 by way of expendi-
tures of money, time and services. (See R.187). In awarding 
$42,587, the lower court discounted plaintiff's demand by 
$22,913. 
Defendant submits that the very nature of the two 
awards given plaintiff through two different trials estab-
lishes just how indeterminable plaintiff's damages were. 
The law is clear that prejudgment interest is not includable 
where the damages cannot be ascertained until final judgment. 
Rauser v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 437 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 
1971); Western Auto Supply co. v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d.36 
(8th Cir. 1954); Portage Ind. Sch. Constr. Corp. v. Stackhouse 
Co., 153 Ind. App. 366, 287 N.E.2d 564 (1972); ~United 
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Pacific Ins. Co. v. Martin & Luther General Co:itractors, Inc I 
" 455 P.2d 664 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1969). In Portage Ind. Sch. 
Constr. Corp., supra, the Court stated: 
"In this case the wide disparity between the 
figure contained in the so-called invoice of 
June 19, 1962, and the demand figure in the 
Appellee's complaint and the actual figure 
of the principal sum of the judgment would 
certainly lead to the conclusion that this 
is a case where damages could not and were 
not ascertained until judgment. 
* * * 
'The test . whether injury and consequent 
damage was complete, must be ascertained as 
of a particular time in accordance with fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of value, 
which a Court or jury must follow in fixing the 
amount, as distinguished from using one's best 
judgment to assess the amount for past and 
future injury or elements not measurable by 
fixed standards of value. '" 
Id., 287 N.E.2d at 569. 
The leading case of Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal. 2d 204, 195 P.li 
408 (1948), is in accord. In Lineman, the California Supreme 
Co_urt stated: 
"[I]nterest is not allowable where the damages 
depend upon no fixed standard and cannot be 
made certain except by accord, verdict or 
decree . 
* * * 
[I]nterest is not allowable when damages can-
not be computed except on conflicting evidence, 
such as in the present case, because of the 
absence of established or reasonably ascertain-
able market prices or values. 
* * * 
The trial court's computation of the damages 
was therefore not based on an established 
market price, but on a value which it was 
compelled to select from conflicting evidence 
relating to the factors of cost, carrying 
charges and profit . 
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p 
* * * 
The judgment is modified by striking there-
from the allowance of interest 
Id., 195 P.2d at 412-413. 
Given the indeterminable nature of plaintiff's damages, and 
the difficulty in their computation, defendant submits that 
it should not be charged with prejudgment interest. 
POINT V 
COSTS 
A. No Witness Fees Are Allowable for the First Trial. 
The allowance of costs is strictly statutory. 
Mcintosh v. Crandall, 47Cal.App.2d 126, 117 P.2d 380 (1941). 
Costs were not recoverable at common law, and any statute 
relating to costs is to be strictly construed. In the 
absence of a statutory authorization, there can be no recovery 
of costs. Id. 
Witness fees in civil cases may be taxed only as 
provided in Utah Code Anno., § 21-5-8 (1953). That statute 
provides in relevant part: 
"The fees of witnesses paid in civil 
causes may be taxed as costs against the 
losing party." (Emphasis added). 
Although the jury in the first trial rendered judgment against 
defendant, that judgment was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. Defendant, therefore, did not "lose" the first 
trial, nor was it the "losing party." When the proceedings 
of a former trial have been vacated, the case must proceed 
de ~- Th parties must be placed in the same position they_ 
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would have been in if no trial had been had. 
"New Trial" § 228. 
58 Am.Jur 2d ~
The lower Court awarded $296.80 in costs for the 
attendance of plaintiff's witnesses at the first trial. 
(R.168 & 169). It is respectfully submitted that this amount 
must be deducted from any costs awarded plaintiff. 
B. Plaintiff's Principals Are Not Entitled to Witn~. 
Plaintiff seeks to recover witness fees paid to 
Messrs. Fahs, Tuckett, and Kesler for their attendance during 
the three days it took to conduct both the first and second 
trials. This is clearly inappropriate because these three 
individuals were not attending merely as witnesses in behalf 
of plaintiff, bu~ rather, were attending to the conduct of 
the suit as plaintiff's principal officers. As stated by 
this Court in Western Creamery Co. v. Malia, 89 Utah 422, 
5 7 p • 2d 7 4 3 , 7 4 6 ( 19 3 6) : 
"One who attends court as the agent of a 
party, necessarily attending to the conduct 
of the suit, cannot be allowed witness' 
fees, although he testifies . " 
At the first trial, these three witnesses all testifo 
on the first day. Mr. Kesler did not take the witness stand 
again and Mr. Tuckett did so only briefly during the seco~ 
day when recalled by plaintiff's counsel. Yet, plaintiff 
seeks to recover witness fees for these individuals for all 
three days of the first trial. This Court should rule as a 
matter of law that plaintiff's principals are not entitled to 
witness fees on the days that they did not testify and, 
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therefore, that the amount of costs, if any, awarded for 
the first trial should be reduced by $54.90. 
In the second trial, Mr. Kesler was called out of 
order on the second day of trial to testify and was· there-
after excused because he had to go out of town. (2d Tr. at 
153). Mr. Tuckett testified on only the first day of trial.· 
Yet, plaintiff seeks to recover witness fees for these 
individuals for all three days of the second trial. It is 
respectfully submitted that the costs allowable for the 
second trial must also be reduced by $54.90, said sum 
representing witness fees awarded to plaintiff's principals 
for days that they did not testify. 
The total amount of costs which were thereby 
improperly awarded to plaintiff for the first trial, and 
as witness fees for its principals on days they did not 
testify at the second trial, is $351.70. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted 
that: 
1. The judgment below should be reversed and a new 
judgment entered in defendant's favor, as a matter of law, 
upon the grounds that the only proper measure of damages for 
breach of an option agreement is the difference between the 
option price and the market value of the property at the time 
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of exercise of the option (and there is no suc:1 difference 
in value in this instant case); or because ;:>l:.:.intiff failed 
to mitigate its damages. 
2. Alternatively, the judgment below should be 
reversed and a new judgment entered against defendant int~ 
amount of $12,000, upon the ground that this a:-:tount, and only 
this amount, represents those expenditures which were 
reasonably incurred by plaintiff and which were foreseeable 
at the time of making the Option Agreement. 
3. Alternatively, that the case be re~anded for a 
new trial because of the insufficiency of the evidence, the 
excessiveness of the verdict, or because of errors in law. 
I 
4. That plaintiff is not entitled to any prejudgment 
1 
interest. 
5. That the total amount of any costs awardable 
to plaintiff is $303.60. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of February, 191i. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
F. S. Prince, Jr. 
Donald J. Winder 
I 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appell:' 
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